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Recent psychiatric research and treatment initiatives have 
tended to move away from traditional diagnostic categories 
and have focused instead on transdiagnostic phenomena, 
such as hallucinations. However, this emphasis on isolated 
experiences may artificially limit the definition of such phe-
nomena and ignore the rich, complex, and dynamic changes 
occurring simultaneously in other domains of experience. 
This article reviews the literature on a range of experien-
tial features associated with psychosis, with a focus on their 
relevance for hallucinations. Phenomenological research 
on changes in cognition, perception, selfhood and reality, 
temporality, interpersonal experience, and embodiment 
are discussed, along with their implications for traditional 
conceptualizations of hallucinations. We then discuss sev-
eral phenomenological and neurocognitive theories, as well 
as the potential impact of trauma on these phenomena. 
Hallucinations are suggested to be an equifinal outcome 
of multiple genetic, neurocognitive, subjective, and social 
processes; by grouping them together under a single, opera-
tionalizable definition, meaningful differences in etiology 
and phenomenology may be ignored. It is suggested that 
future research efforts strive to incorporate a broader range 
of experiential alterations, potentially expanding on tra-
ditional definitions of hallucinations. Relevance for clini-
cal practice, including emphasizing phenomenologically 
responsive techniques and developing targeted new thera-
pies, is discussed.
Keywords:  hallucinations/voice hearing/phenomenological 
psychiatry/psychosis/schizophrenia
Introduction
Recent trends in psychiatric research and treatment initia-
tives have focused on specific symptoms or experiential 
features of psychiatric syndromes, while de-emphasizing 
conventional diagnostic or classification frameworks. 
This includes the National Institute of Mental Health’s 
Research Domain Criteria, a strategic initiative that 
encourages the adoption of a trans-diagnostic matrix 
of units of analysis (ie, from molecules to self-report) 
regardless of the syndromic/diagnostic context.1 In addi-
tion, research groups like the International Consortium 
on Hallucination Research (ICHR) have encouraged new 
projects that focus on hallucinations across a range of 
physical and psychiatric conditions as well as nonclinical 
populations.2 These and other initiatives have the advan-
tage of supporting high-quality research on segmented 
aspects of human experience, deliberately avoiding the 
assumption that diagnostic syndromes represent the most 
valid and useful object of enquiry.3 However, such a focus 
risks losing sight of the complex and dynamic experiential 
context(s) in which hallucinations (or any construct) may 
arise, which might be essential for determining etiologies, 
treatments, and other clinical concerns.4,5
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In parallel, a limitation of much research in this area is 
the dominance of operationalized definitions and measure-
ment tools to maximize reliability and simplify diagnostic 
criteria. While this emphasis on operationalization may 
help to achieve reliable and interpretable data, it risks a pre-
mature simplification of psychopathology.6 This has pri-
oritized the most easily operationalized symptoms such as 
hallucinations and delusions over those that involve more 
individually variable or less easily communicated subjective 
experiences.7,8 In addition, what counts as a “symptom” is 
impacted by cultural paradigms and expressions; Western 
medical models, and perhaps the language of Western 
society in general, may not supply the words or concepts 
for people to relate subtle and fluctuating forms of expe-
rience, potentially restricting the psychiatric phenomena 
that are reported by patients or attended to by clinicians.9,10 
Hallucinations are especially prone to these issues due to 
the apparent simplicity of their mainstream definition. 
Their seemingly straightforward characterization belies an 
experiential complexity that, while not new to literature on 
these phenomena, is currently borne out by many strands 
of contemporary research.11–14 Indeed, as Berrios and 
Marková15 note, the conceptual history of hallucinations is 
a long and complex one, and includes debates about the 
representational vs nonrepresentational nature of halluci-
nations, their equivalency with sensory perception, and the 
distinction (if any) between hallucinations found in psychi-
atric vs neurological or other organic conditions.
This article aims to broaden this lens by examining 
key areas of experience that could contextualize halluci-
nations within the larger realm of mental or experiential 
states associated with psychosis or psychotic vulnerability: 
cognitive experience, perceptual experience, selfhood and 
sense of reality, temporality, interpersonal experience, and 
embodiment (supplementary material note i). In doing 
so, we hope to be able to capture the vast heterogeneity 
within diagnostic categories, especially the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (supplementary material note ii). We then 
discuss phenomenological and neurocognitive models that 
attempt to integrate these diverse transformations (supple-
mentary material note iii). Finally, we consider contextual 
factors that may impact experience, especially the potential 
role of trauma in the development of psychosis. In doing 
so, we hope to identify numerous areas for future research 
that would assist in promoting more effective and valid 
approaches to assessment, study design, and intervention.
Domains of Experience
Cognitive Experience and Stream of Consciousness
Cognition in schizophrenia is typically discussed in empiri-
cal literature with respect to changes in memory, attention, 
and executive functioning, which are believed to underlie 
disorganized thought and behavior (eg, derailment, tangen-
tiality). However, the way in which thought, memory, and 
attention are experienced is also notably altered in schizo-
phrenia. These include features usually associated with 
acute psychosis such as thought withdrawal and insertion, 
thought broadcasting, and passivity experiences. They also 
include more subtle experiences, such as loss of thought 
ipseity (the sense that thoughts do not belong to oneself) 
and spatialization of experience (the sense that thought has 
spatial or dimensional qualities).16 Such transformations of 
cognitive experience may be present in all stages of schizo-
phrenia (including the prodrome, acute psychosis, and more 
long-term or chronic stages)17 as well as in the nonpsychotic 
tails of its spectrum conditions (eg, schizotypal personality 
disorder, schizophrenia in remission). They may also impact 
standard cognitive processes; eg, memory and attention are 
likely to be disrupted when thoughts seem alien or foreign, 
and are no longer felt to be a relatively transparent means 
of apprehending the world.18
Some of these cognitive phenomena bear resemblance 
to the concept of “soundless voices,” which can be traced 
back to Bleuler’s observations of patients with halluci-
nations: they did not describe the sensory features of 
actually “hearing” voices but related them to cognitive 
intrusions. Those who experience these phenomena are 
often convinced of the “otherness” of such intrusions 
and tend not to attribute the origin of these soundless 
voices to their own thinking processes.19 On the other 
hand, thought echo or “audible thoughts” denotes the 
perceptualization or vocalization of one’s own thoughts 
into an external space, whereas thought insertion is the 
inward projection of “other” thoughts into one’s mental 
space. All three phenomena can be framed as alterations 
of thought-agency and ownership.20
Along similar lines, Mayer-Gross proposed that thought 
insertion involves a “becoming sensory” (Versinnlichung) 
of those thoughts.21 That is, they are no longer experienced 
as thoughts but as material objects inserted by foreign agency. 
He further noted that in early schizophrenia there may be 
the nearly simultaneous experience of verbal and nonver-
bal hallucinations (akoasms such as buzzing, whistling, and 
roaring), thought insertion, thoughts becoming loud, etc. 
Thus, it has been argued that auditory verbal hallucina-
tions and disturbances of thought agency and ownership 
differ in degree rather than in kind.22 Such theories suggest 
that focusing on the easily measurable “auditory verbal 
hallucinations” may obfuscate these subtler variants; more 
research is necessary to determine whether a broader defi-
nition is necessary to encompass these and other variations 
of hallucinations,14 and whether they should be viewed as 
on a continuum with nonpsychotic phenomena.
Perceptual Experience
Although the above section discusses the semi-percep-
tual qualities of cognition, an additional line of research 
focuses on perceptual alterations themselves. Heidelberg 
psychiatrist Mayer-Gross may be regarded as herald of 
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the “perceptual anomalies” approach to schizophre-
nia. Mayer-Gross, his Heidelberg contemporary, Viktor 
von Weizsäcker, and the phenomenological psychiatrists 
Matussek, Conrad, Binswanger, and Blankenburg all 
considered changes in perceptual organization to play 
a fundamental role in schizophrenia.21,23 Matussek, eg, 
emphasized the impact of disruptions of context on the 
perception of objects, which allows certain perceptual 
qualities/details to dominate over others and be imbued 
with unusual significance.24 Rather than circumscribed 
perceptual alteration, Matussek highlighted a global, 
Gestalt-like change in the structure of experience.
Mayer Gross’ fellow colleague in Heidelberg, Jaspers25 
developed the concept of “pseudohallucinations” (PH), 
which stood in stark contrast to the perceptual anoma-
lies approach.26 Jaspers adapted his concept from the 
German psychiatrist Hagen and the Russian psychiatrist 
Kandinsky (who himself  experienced hallucinations). 
Not considered “real” hallucinations, PH are not percep-
tual experiences but based on ideas (Vorstellungen). For 
Jaspers, genuine or true hallucinations are experienced as 
“objectively” present (leibhaftig), and may be experienced 
alongside real perceptions in external objective space. In 
contrast, PH are imaginary (bildhaftig), not experienced 
as concretely real, have the character of subjectivity, and 
appear in inner subjective space. PH have been criticized 
for conceptual confusion, lack of clinical utility, and his-
torical inaccuracy.26–28 Mayer-Gross criticized Jaspers’ 
overly strict opposition between “objective” percep-
tion (genuine hallucination) vs subjective image (PH), 
or “outer” vs “inner,” which often failed to distinguish 
actual clinical cases.26 It also does not leave open the pos-
sibility that PH may also have their source in low level 
sensory or sensorimotor processing.
Mayer Gross’ approach is supported by a number of 
empirical studies, which have found evidence of fragmen-
tation, or changes in perceptual organization, in schiz-
ophrenia, including difficulties seeing objects or scenes 
as whole gestalts.29–31 Perceptual fragmentation is asso-
ciated with worse outcomes,31 and may contribute to 
figure-ground confusion and loss of perceptual stabil-
ity, with objects appearing to change shape or appear-
ance.32,33 Persons with these visual distortions are also 
more likely to experience visual hallucinations,34 possibly 
pointing to shared processes contributing to these phe-
nomena. These lines of research suggest that sensory and 
perceptual anomalies, including perceptual disorganiza-
tion, may be implicated in phenomena that meet criteria 
for hallucinations, and investigation of these changes and 
the processes involved may shed light on the development 
of hallucinations.
Selfhood and Reality
Much typical human experience consists of being 
engaged and absorbed in a combination of cognitive, 
physical, and affective activity within a world of (animate 
and inanimate) objects. The first-person perspective or 
“mineness” of this interaction with the world provides 
a form of implicit self-awareness (it is I who is having 
these experiences), which is sometimes referred to as self-
presence or as self-affection.35 This can be altered in the 
schizophrenia spectrum, in which the self  may seem to 
stand distant or alienated from experience, rather than 
implicitly and constantly present.18 Various forms of 
depersonalization, a sense of inner void, and derealiza-
tion, a feeling that objects or the world are less real or 
immediately present, can reflect the weakening of self-
presence.16 Numerous studies have found that changes 
in self- and reality-experience in the form of dissociation 
predict positive psychotic symptoms, including halluci-
nations, particularly among individuals who have experi-
enced childhood trauma.36
Explanations for the relationship between dissociation 
and hallucinatory phenomena are varied, and include the 
hypotheses that perceptual anomalies increase the risk of 
dissociation37; that dissociation weakens cognitive inhibi-
tion and therefore increases vulnerability to anomalous 
perceptual experiences36; and that hallucinations may be 
features of dissociation (ie, inner speech is experienced as 
separate from oneself).38 Such findings may challenge the 
notion of the schizophrenia spectrum and even psychosis 
itself  (ie, that such symptoms do not reflect a disturbance 
of reality testing, but are better understood as dissocia-
tive processes),39 although other factors unique to schiz-
ophrenia or psychosis may also play a role in increasing 
vulnerability to hallucinations. Alterations of selfhood 
and presence, then, may be contributing factors in the 
development of hallucinations across multiple distinct 
psychiatric conditions.
Temporality
Persons with psychosis may experience a variety of time 
distortions, such as lack of sense of time continuity, or 
a dissociation between internal and external time, ie, a 
mismatch between the speed of inner awareness and the 
speed of external events (supplementary material note 
iv).40–47
Some phenomenologists have theorized that alterations 
in the sense of time continuity is associated with changes in 
“minimal” self, ie, the ability to feel oneself as being present 
here and now.43,46 Giersch and Mishara, eg, have proposed 
that disruption to minimal self in schizophrenia involves 
abnormalities in unconscious automatic processing, 
including the processing of time (at intervals far too brief  
to be experienced consciously; supplementary material 
note v).48–50 Experimental research indicates that anomalies 
of temporal processing in schizophrenia patients emerge 
at very brief time scales (8 and 17 ms),51 suggesting that 
“protentions” (ie, anticipations [often nonconscious] that 
serve as the context for moment-to-moment predictions) 
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are altered in psychosis and occur very early in the “phe-
nomenological hierarchy” (supplementary material note 
vi). These results have been proposed to be consistent 
with impairments in predictive coding,52 the notion that 
sequences of information are predicted in advance to allow 
for the detection of unexpected events and a fluid percep-
tion of the outer world.51 In addition, Fuchs has argued 
that the alterations in selfhood in schizophrenia are related 
to changes in the ability to link the present moment with 
what is about to happen, and to move into the probable or 
anticipated future, which may result in the disconnection 
and fragmentation of perceived events.53
This work on continuity of minimal self  points to the 
possible role of temporal changes in alterations in cog-
nition and perception, such as the sense of ownership 
and anticipation of self-generated events, thought to be 
related to hallucinations: when thoughts and sensations 
are no longer anticipated and embedded in a sense of self  
that persists over time, they may instead be experienced 
as externally generated objects rather than “inhabited” 
aspects of selfhood.
Interpersonal Experience
Alterations in social experience have long been one of the 
hallmarks of schizophrenia and play a key role in func-
tional outcome. Many phenomenological psychiatrists 
have emphasized changes in interpersonal attunement and 
apparent alterations in the commonsense social world in 
schizophrenia. Bleuler considered autism, the “detach-
ment from reality, together with the relative and absolute 
predominance of the inner life,”54 to be highly specific to 
schizophrenia, while Minkowski proposed that a “loss of 
vital contact” with the immediate, social world was the core 
alteration underlying schizophrenia.55 Indeed, many per-
sons with first-episode schizophrenia describe the sense of 
being different from others,56 which cannot be articulated in 
terms of concrete characteristics, but rather as having more 
of an ontological dimension57; as one individual described 
it, “I always felt different, as if I  belonged to another 
race.”58 In addition, psychosis has long been viewed as an 
alteration in the boundary between self and other. Laing 
suggested that persons with psychosis are prone to feelings 
of “engulfment,” the threat of losing one’s identity to the 
influence of others, and believed that the core alteration in 
schizophrenia could be characterized as “ontological inse-
curity,” or a fundamental difficulty regarding differentia-
tion with the world, autonomy, and continuity of being.59
Alterations of both attunement and ego-boundaries 
may be involved in hallucinatory experiences. Federn,60 
eg, suggested that psychotic experiences including hallu-
cinations and delusions were indicative of changes in the 
inner ego boundary, the dynamic interplay between “inner 
mentality” and external reality or “non-ego.” In addition, 
some individuals with psychosis describe a tendency to pri-
oritize private (not intersubjectively available) perceptual 
phenomena and to trust the reality of those phenomena 
over consensual, intersubjective reality, while others have 
described a confusion between what is “real” (ie, per-
ceived by others) and what is imagined, remembered, or 
dreamed.61 Research on source-monitoring in schizophre-
nia—the ability to determine or remember whether a stim-
ulus was internally or externally generated—lends some 
support to this hypothesis.62,63 Furthermore, research on 
the impact of interpersonal experience on hallucinations 
suggests that interpersonal context may be at least as 
important as—and potentially contribute to—perceptual 
or cognitive transformations; and that therapeutic work 
on relationships and communication with others and with 
voices may help individuals cope with hallucinations.64,65
Embodiment
Alterations in bodily self-representation have been sug-
gested to be another core component of schizophrenia, 
and include sudden changes in size and shape of the body, 
alterations in body ownership, anomalous agency, and 
even out-of-body experiences.33,66,67 Cenesthesic changes 
(involving unusual awareness of or changes in bodily 
sensations), including numbness of the body, electric 
and thermal sensations, sensation of abnormal pressure 
or weight, and vestibular sensations, are also observed 
in schizophrenia and are associated with clinical symp-
toms.68 Such changes in bodily self-presence are present 
during the prodromal stage and remain salient through-
out the course of schizophrenia.18,69–73
Although these phenomena may contribute to a range of 
hallucinatory somatic experiences, some of the most striking 
phenomena appear as forms of “autoscopy.” Autoscopy is a 
loosely related complex of experiences in which one sees (or 
experiences) a “double” as external to one’s current vantage 
point. The autoscopic experience may last from seconds to 
hours or, in some cases, be present for years at a time (sup-
plementary material note vii).74 In vulnerable individuals, 
autoscopic experience can be triggered via a proprioceptive-
tactile illusion,75 while in the general population, autoscopic 
phenomena are associated with elevated schizotypy75,76 and 
transliminality (a hypothesized tendency toward multisen-
sory experiences, mystical experience, and absorption).77,78 
Some voice hearers have indicated that their voices have 
much more of a physical, embodied quality, rather than 
being purely auditory (or of another sensory modality).79 
Such findings on alterations of embodiment and autoscopic 
experiences suggest the need to focus on the relationship of 
changes in mental representations of the body to the devel-
opment of a range of hallucinatory experiences.
Theories of Prereflective Change in Psychosis
Although it is useful for descriptive purposes to catego-
rize subjective phenomena separately, they should not 
be thought of as clearly distinct from each other, but are 
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likely to be intimately interrelated (supplementary mate-
rial note viii).16 Some phenomenological researchers of 
schizophrenia suggest that these features are expressive 
of a Gestalt or structural shift in subjectivity, ie, an alter-
ation of the entire intentional framework that supports 
the experience of oneself  and the world.80 Others have 
suggested that they may best be viewed as different mani-
festations of a psychosis spectrum (see Kamens10 for an 
overview of alternative models of schizophrenia and psy-
chosis). Here, we briefly present several prominent con-
temporary phenomenological models of schizophrenia 
along with their conceptualizations of hallucinations. In 
addition, we review several neurocognitive theories of 
psychosis (with and without a schizophrenia diagnosis) 
and briefly discuss the role of environmental or social 
factors, particularly trauma, in the development of these 
experiences.
Ipseity Disturbance Model
One prominent phenomenological theory of schizo-
phrenia is the Ipseity Disturbance Model.18 This model 
suggests that the heterogeneous experiential changes in 
schizophrenia result from changes in basic or prereflec-
tive selfhood, or ipseity, the fundamental level of con-
sciousness that endows immediate experience with an 
implicit sense of ownership (“my-ness” or “mineness”) 
that persists through time.
When basic selfhood is disrupted, the result may be 
a decreased sense of self  as the immediate and dynamic 
center of experience (diminished self-affection or self-pres-
ence) and a tendency for the normally tacit background 
of experience to be taken up as the object of attention, 
scrutiny, or analysis (hyperreflexivity). Such alterations 
in self  experience are likely to be felt long before the 
appearance of psychotic experiences, but may also evolve 
into positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms dur-
ing periods of acute psychosis.81,82 A number of studies 
have found that these more subtle changes are associated 
with increased risk of developing psychosis,70 and that 
they differentiate schizophrenia spectrum disorders from 
other psychiatric and personality disorders.83–86
According to this model, hallucinations arise as a result 
of decreased indwelling (ie, tacitly inhabiting those pro-
cesses as the medium of experience, rather than explicitly 
reflecting on them) in one’s cognitive processes and other 
subjective experiences, as well as an exaggerated tendency 
to take up these experiences as objects of attention; thus, 
thought and other processes are “no longer permeated 
with the sense of selfhood” but take on the perceptual 
properties of objects in the world.18
Perceptual Anomalies Approach
The hypothesis that ipseity represents the self-distur-
bances/disorders (Ichstörungen) in schizophrenia either 
historically or phenomenologically remains a topic of 
debate.21,87,88 In contrast, rather than situating the experi-
ence of the self  as immediate prereflective consciousness, 
the perceptual anomalies approach finds phenomenolog-
ical and experimental evidence for an alteration of low-
level perceptual processing.21,88,89 Generally, we experience 
controlled and automatic processing working together 
seamlessly in everyday cognition, without giving much 
thought to how this takes place. However, as Mayer-
Gross and other members of the early Heidelberg school 
suggested, the self-disturbances/disorders are character-
ized by experiential passivity, or “the nonparticipation in 
one’s experience,” as if  everything plays before the patient 
on a theater stage.21
This model proposes that self-disturbances arise from 
a disconnection of automatic processing from attend-
ant conscious, controlled processing, due to low-level 
perceptual anomalies in the temporal ordering of expe-
rience.21,48,49 Hallucinations are considered part of these 
self-disturbances to the extent they are perceived as 
occurring independently from self. There is a separa-
tion between self  and its automatic processing, experi-
enced as due to foreign agency. Thus, while perception 
and action are typically strongly coupled, it is proposed 
that these processes become disconnected in persons with 
psychosis,21,48,49,52,90 and so hallucinations may involve 
the increasing passivity/absorption of the subject, ie, a 
diminished embodied participation in one’s perceptual, 
cognitive, volitional processes, etc.
Contra the ipseity view, then, the self  is already 
mediated by an embodied perception action cycle (Von 
Weizsaecker’s23,91 “Gestalt-circle” or a “revolving door 
principle” between perception and movement) before 
becoming conscious, rather than the immediate prere-
flective self-affection of  ipseity. With disruption of  the 
embodied (spatial, temporal and sensorimotor) relation-
ship to the hallucinatory object, there is a loss of  per-
spective and ability to explore the hallucination from 
different viewpoints.26 Anomalies very early in low-level 
sensory processing and/or the temporal organization 
of  experience may be involved via this disturbance in 
perception/action coupling,21,48,49 or, perhaps, such bot-
tom-up anomalies may more directly affect the experi-
ence of  world and self  (ie, before a perception action 
cycle).92 This problem requires further interdisciplinary 
collaboration between the experimental and phenome-
nological approaches.
Narrative Self Models
The social or narrative level of selfhood is thought to 
be built on the minimal self, or ipseity.93 At the narrative 
level, the self  goes beyond the fundamental level of sense 
of ownership and agency and immersion in the surround-
ing world, and takes on an identity that is situated socially 
and reflectively. In psychosis, both levels of self  can be 
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significantly altered, albeit in different ways. Lysaker and 
Lysaker94 suggest a primary role for alterations of narra-
tive self, relating schizophrenia to a detachment of nar-
rative from its communicative or dialogical purpose both 
with oneself  and with others.
According to a narrative model, hallucinations are the 
result not of unusual perceptual experiences, but of one’s 
narrative and subjective position in relation to them (sup-
plementary material note ix). Thus, it is the attribution 
of anomalous experiences to perception of an external 
event, particularly in the context of describing that expe-
rience to another person, that allows something to be 
defined as a hallucination.95
Neurocognitive Models of Psychosis
Several theories address the way that changes in brain 
structure or activity impact various cognitive processes, 
potentially giving rise to the phenomenological descrip-
tions and theories described above. One core process that 
has been hypothesized to be involved is working memory 
(WM), an active, limited-capacity, short-term memory 
system that temporarily maintains information and pro-
vides an interface between perception, long-term memory, 
and action.96 Thus, WM is the cognitive glue that binds 
our moment-to-moment experiences, and may contrib-
ute to a continuous and unified sense of self  across time. 
When WM is compromised, our experience of the inter-
nal and external world becomes fragmented, disrupting 
this continuous sense of self.97,98 Deficits in working mem-
ory may affect on-line self-monitoring and allocation of 
attention to the task at hand, potentially contributing to 
the development of hallucinations as a result of a discon-
nection between oneself and one’s thoughts.
The incorrect assignment of significance to otherwise 
neutral sensory input, otherwise known as aberrant sali-
ence, impacts learning, attention and memory abilities.99 
In psychosis, hallucinations and delusions may originate 
from these aberrant salient inputs, with numerous neuro-
cognitive studies supporting this hypothesis.100, 101 (supple-
mentary material note x).99,102
Other candidates for neurocognitive mechanisms of 
psychosis include changes in source monitoring, the abil-
ity to distinguish internally from externally generated 
stimuli or to determine the correct internal source (eg, 
imagination vs action); predictive coding, the process of 
making automatic, implicit predictions about events and 
updating these predictions in response to new informa-
tion; and activation of the default mode network, the 
network of brain activation that is active during passive 
rest and mind-wandering, and is thought to play a role in 
self-reflection (for reviews, see103,104).
What these phenomenological and neurocognitive 
models all have in common is their implicit acknowledge-
ment that hallucinations are not isolated experiences, 
but are expressions of much broader transformations of 
one’s relationship to oneself  and the world. That they are 
perceived as having distinct features, and taking on cer-
tain forms, may have to do as much (or more) with the 
contexts in which such transformations appear and prog-
ress. For example, Larøi et al105 note that varying cultural 
definitions of “reality,” acceptance of hallucinations as 
expressions of grief  and other reactions to life events, and 
views of hallucinations as desirable (vs symptoms of ill-
ness) may all shape the ways that hallucinations are expe-
rienced. Thus, while the above models emphasize changes 
that occur at the level of the individual, it is essential to 
consider the role of social, cultural, and environmental 
factors in these experiential transformations. We there-
fore close with a discussion of the impact of trauma, one 
significant environmental and social factor, on the devel-
opment of hallucinations.
Trauma and Hallucinations
Traumatic events are the prototype of eminently inter-
personal, environmental factors that could significantly 
destabilize and alter subjective experience at various lev-
els.106 A history of neglect significantly increases the like-
lihood of developing schizophrenia (and other forms of 
clinical symptomology)107,108; traumatic and other adverse 
events are also associated with the development of hal-
lucinations in both clinical and nonclinical samples, and 
across a range of diagnoses.109 It has been proposed that 
several psychological processes may be involved in the 
development of psychotic symptoms among trauma sur-
vivors, including patterns of emotion regulation devel-
oped to cope with trauma, unique qualities associated 
with memories of traumatic events (including encod-
ing, retrieval, and processing), and changes to personal 
semantic memory.110 Such changes may blur the distinc-
tion between what is currently happening and what is 
being remembered or imagined, and may significantly 
alter many of the features of experience discussed in this 
article (supplementary material note xi).111
In addition, research in the area of epigenetics suggests 
that such changes in response to environmental stressors 
may occur at the molecular level, leading to changes at 
the experiential level.112 The epigenetic layer is often con-
ceptualized as the interface between gene and environ-
ment, which allows it to recode psychological experiences 
into a biochemical inventory that retains these events over 
the longer term in a type of biochemical memory. Thus, 
stressful early experiences can modify these biochemical 
arrangements whose imprint remains far beyond the per-
iod of the actual stress, which has significant implications 
for prevention, identification, and intervention in psy-
chosis113; it also explains findings of a strong relationship 
between trauma (and other adverse experiences) and the 
experiential changes involved in psychosis.114
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Discussion
We have considered a range of experiential features and 
hypothesized mechanisms associated with psychosis, 
with attention to one commonly researched feature of 
psychosis, hallucinations. In doing so, we hope to have 
demonstrated not only the variety of manifestations of 
psychosis, but also the intricate intertwining of experien-
tial domains and the interplay between phenomenology, 
neurocognitive factors, and environment.
It is unlikely that hallucinations or any other experi-
ential alterations traditionally associated with psycho-
sis will be experienced as discrete or static phenomena. 
Indeed, the findings presented above suggest that halluci-
nations may occur in multiple perceptual modalities and 
may be continuous with nonhallucinatory experiences 
(eg, thought insertion, out-of-body experiences, dissoci-
ation, alterations in perception). It is similarly unlikely 
that the development of hallucinations can be attributed 
to one core process or causal factor. Genetics, neurocog-
nitive processes, subjective experience, cognitive styles or 
patterns of interpretation, and cultural and social envi-
ronments are likely to interact in complex ways, with 
hallucinations as an equifinal outcome. Given this com-
plexity, it is understandable that research, diagnostic cri-
teria, and clinical interventions would attempt to simplify 
the defining characteristics of hallucinations. However, 
doing so risks ignoring a diverse array of associated or 
interwoven experiences, focusing instead on symptoms 
with narrow, concrete, and easily agreed-upon definitions.
This review suggests some key ways in which research 
on hallucinations can evolve. First, there are a number 
of identifiable subjective experiences co-occurring with 
hallucinations that do not fit the conventional definition 
of hallucinations. These are in need of greater research 
attention, both on their own and in relation to hallucina-
tory phenomena. As part of this working group, ongoing 
and future projects will systematically inquire into the full 
range of experiential modalities that are involved in par-
ticipants’ hallucinations, while other investigations may be 
facilitated by wide-ranging phenomenologically oriented 
interviews.16,47 Second, patterns of covariation with hallu-
cinations need to be understood, and if clustering together, 
explanatory and etiological models of hallucinations need 
to be able to account for their co-occurrence. For example, 
several researchers are already exploring the relationship 
between phenomena like thought insertion and voice hear-
ing.20,115 In addition, dissociation among voice hearers may 
moderate various outcomes associated with hallucinations; 
addressing this factor may reduce unnecessary variability 
within samples. Third, the breadth of phenomena sug-
gests reconsidering how hallucinations should be defined. 
Traditional definitions have emphasized sensory qualities 
and their realness and distinctiveness from mental imagery 
and verbal thought. The importance of this boundary is 
questionable when considering findings on this range of 
experiential transformations. For example, future research 
on hallucinations may also benefit from including subjects 
who experience thought insertion or thought passivity 
(rather than limiting recruitment to those who meet a nar-
rower definition of hallucinations). There may be value in 
incorporating other elements into a definition of a broader 
construct of hallucinations, such as changes in agency or 
ownership of thought, separation from self-experience, 
uncertainty about internal vs external phenomena, and 
anomalous awareness of the presence of others.
Clinical Implications
A potential benefit of broadening the lens of hallucinations 
is to assist practitioners in attending to, and developing a 
vocabulary for enquiring about, these broader aspects of 
experience. Interventions targeting auditory hallucinations 
have focused on typical verbal characteristics, and the com-
mon perception of voices as sentient others.116 These have 
included cognitive restructuring targeting beliefs about 
voice power,117 and reducing submissive and hostile inter-
personal relationships that develop with voices.64,118 While 
common, these targets are rather specific, and potentially 
secondary, elements of hallucinations rather than the more 
fundamental phenomenology of psychosis.
In considering this broader phenomenology, ther-
apeutic approaches may try to more directly target the 
underlying changes in areas such as self  experience and 
sensory and somatic integration. To date, there has been 
some development of methods to address depersonali-
zation and derealization experiences in people with psy-
chosis,119 but these remain at an early stage. Approaches 
that encourage metacognitive awareness may also be 
helpful. For example, Lysaker and colleagues120 have 
developed interventions designed to foster awareness of 
different cognitive operations and integrate them into a 
more coherent experience of self. Finally, this review sug-
gests the need for further investigation of therapies that 
target the interactive, dynamic, and phenomenologically 
rich nature of hallucinations, such as Avatar Therapy,121 
Compassion Focused Therapy,122 and Voice-Dialogue.123
Conclusions
This article has reviewed domains of experience that 
extend beyond voices to include self  and reality, cognitive 
experience, perceptual anomalies, temporality, interper-
sonal experience, and embodiment. In addition, we have 
reviewed several of the major theories of prereflective 
change in psychosis to describe the ways these experien-
tial transformations are inter-related. We also considered 
the impact of trauma on the development of hallucina-
tions, though additional work is necessary to more fully 
consider the impact of cultural, social, and environmen-
tal factors on the construct of psychosis and the expres-
sion of associated symptoms. We suggest that all of 
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these domains should be considered in directing future 
research or clinical work on hallucinations—or any other 
aspect of psychosis. While symptom-specific research has 
resulted in valuable new discoveries and clinical interven-
tions, it is essential not to lose sight of the experiential 
context out of which hallucinations develop.
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